Showing posts with label technical. Show all posts
Showing posts with label technical. Show all posts

Sunday, August 6, 2017

"Your connection is not secure"

A user asks …
« From time to time I update my notebook, Windows 10, with the usual Windows random updates and some others like Firefox and now I seem to be locked out of accessing most of my favorite sites by Firefox. I can get to them through Internet Explorer and Edge, but I don’t know how to move my favorites file over to either of those two browsers. Anyway, I want to correct my Firefox if I can. I have attached a print screen file to show you what I am getting. »


--- Techy alert – How we know a connection is secure ---
First, some background. More and more websites are available with https secure connections. This is good. At its most basic level it prevents anyone (such as your ISP or the government) between you and the website from seeing what you send out (a search on a touchy topic) or getting back (the newest unreleased tune or TV episode). This is desirable because it protects the privacy of good people as well as bad. It’s even better because when you’re communicating with financial, shopping, medical, legal, and other sites; the enhanced version of https verifies not only that no one can eavesdrop on your conversation, but that the owner of the website is who they claim to be.

Some browsers have announced that they will soon flag any non-https website as potentially risky. They also will scare you if some component, such as a picture, of a truly secure site is not delivered by https. This is a nuisance for many websites, such as my blog, that are not dealing in money matters or confidential information. Fortunately most servers are now able to install basic https with no cost and minimal skill.

When you connect to an https site, you receive a certificate from the site that is validated by a Certificate Authority. If the CA is not built in to your browser from when the browser was installed, you will get a message that the certificate is not recognized. The certificate also has to match specifics to the web page and have appropriate valid dates. For example, if the certificate is issued to website.com and you browsed to www.website.com, it may not be accepted. Similarly, if it expired yesterday, it may be appropriate but not valid.

Certificates also could be counterfeited, giving you confidence in your session while it’s being managed by a Man In The Middle. The MITM would typically involve malicious action starting at the first connection between you and the internet. For example, an ISP, a business, or a bogus “free WiFi” connection could be reading your session while the lock on your screen is for their own certificate. Protect against this potential privacy leakage by checking the certificate fingerprint you get against a known unspoofable fingerprint from GRC at https://www.grc.com/fingerprints.htm.

--- end Techy Alert – Back to your question ---

Funny thing about that. Welcome to nanny computing. Software from Windows to Notepad to my new car all want to tell you what to do and protect you from skinning your knees. Of course, the first thing they’re going to do is put squirrel guards up so you can’t climb any trees.

I had no problems getting into the website with Firefox 54.0.1 (32-bit) by typing the exact address you had. I also got to their secure (https) homepage by typing website.com in the address bar and hitting Enter. Try starting from that point and working your way to the signin screen. You may need to re-save your bookmark to the screen before signin because for many sites that is not a real web destination, but created on-the-fly for your environment.

By the way, if you click Advanced on the blocked page, you may be able to see why Firefox thinks this site is not good and decide to override their restriction. You want to override only if it shows a trivial error. I consider “trivial” to be something like a recently expired certificate if you trusted it previously or a slightly different domain name such as connecting to www.website.com and the cert is for website.com. Do not trust it if you’re looking for website.com and the cert is for a different extension like website.cn!

You can also double-check the cert fingerprint to protect from a Man In The Middle. Go to https://www.grc.com/fingerprints.htm and enter the exact address between “https://” and the next “/”. Read the details on the page to learn how to find the fingerprint from your session. Sadly Edge does not have an interface to show details of the certificate. Microsoft’s “solution” is to view the cert with Internet Explorer on the same computer. (Opera and Google Chrome use the same certificate store as Edge/IE so, if they say it’s OK, it’s OK in Edge.)

1a) All browsers have some means to export and import bookmarks (favorites), and possibly history and cookies, to and from a file. When you first install them, most browsers will also grab bookmarks directly from another browser in the same session without your needing to export them. Check your browser’s Help pages or your favorite search engine for instructions (always start at the publisher’s site before you go to third-party advisors).

However, most browser settings are user specific. If you’re moving to another computer or a different user on the same computer, you will have to go through the export to file process. Some browsers will sync their settings to other devices – if you’re willing to give a lot of personal information to the publisher.

1b)    While you’re playing with your browsers’ settings, go on and look through the privacy settings. In particular, enable Do Not Track (many browsers leave it off by default) and disable 3rd party cookies and allowing your browser to save passwords. Tracking and 3rd party cookies are just cowardly ways for browsers and websites to make money off you. Browsers have historically poor control over protecting stored passwords. Instead, opt to use a recommended password manager such as LastPass or PasswordSafe.

Open links:
Fingerprint    https://www.grc.com/fingerprints.htm
Me    https://technologyinterpreter.info
Last Pass    https://s.zaitech.com/SignupForLastPass
PasswordSafe    https://pwsafe.org/

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Creative Commons License. This work by Bill Barnes is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 US License. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at https://zaitech.com/satellite/contacts.htm.
(cc) 2017- Bill Barnes - Disclaimer - Home Page - Blogs Home

Monday, September 5, 2016

A useful utility

How many keyboards and screens do you have on your desk?

Here's a utility (skip down) to help tame a tangle, but first, the history.

Many hobbyists, power users, and business people find it necessary to work on more than one computer at a time. Lots of people have multiple monitors, but this applies if you have a complete additional computer and monitor at your workstation.

I have long used a KVM (keyboard-video-mouse switch) to use two computers with a single set of desktop components. In the mid-1990s the keyboard would not reliably switch so I kept a second keyboard connected. Unfortunately, I often forgot to move to the alternate keyboard and would type a command to "computer A" that actually had a deleterious effect on "computer B".

I now have 3 monitors on my desk. My primary computer has dual screens and the third is connected to a secondary computer so I can continue to work while monitoring a process - or watching Netflix.

Start reading again ...

I used to use a KVM to control the secondary computer - ignoring the video component. Then I discovered a free utility from Microsoft Garage. This is a group that thinks up neat stuff and makes it work - at least sorta. But the powers decide it's not commercial or of broad interest and they abandon the project. But they make the program available - without any promises of support, updates, or even that it will function as described.

I'm using Microsoft's Mouse without Borders* to control my secondary computer. It allows the mouse and keyboard to move seamlessly across up to 4 computers, each with their own monitor. Move your mouse and instantly you're controlling a different computer. Slide back and you're on the original. Even the clipboard comes across more smoothly than it does for many remote control programs.

One of its quirks is that it doesn't reliably reconnect after a reboot. You still might need a KVM or extra keyboard for that twice a month that you have to reboot your computers.

LINKS 
Full links are offered so you can examine the URL to ensure there is no hidden misdirection.

Mouse without Borders: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=35460 

Creative Commons License. This work by Bill Barnes is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 US License. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://zaitech.com/satellite/contacts.htm.
(cc) 2016- Bill Barnes - Disclaimer - Home Page - Blogs Home

Tuesday, April 29, 2014

The power of notoriety

Heartbleed and you
If you don't see this, you're using an old version of IE. Read "If you really want to keep your Windows XP." (April 2014)

Just after I posted my item on The Second Factor (1), I saw a syndicated story under the heading of “Double-layer passwords offer additional protection online.” It started out “If the Heartbleed security threat teaches us anything, it’s that passwords don’t offer total protection.” (2)

While that was a good article on why and how multi-factor authentication is valuable, its reference to Heartbleed was as valid a lead as a picture of a scantily-clad model.

Don’t get me wrong. Both topics are important considerations for your security online. But I haven’t seen any clear lay explanation as to the risk and impact of Heartbleed on the ordinary user.

First the technical details. Heartbleed was a flaw in OpenSSL, a component of certain webservers, from 2012 until April 9, 2014. Depending on whom you listen to, this flaw could have affected between 66% and 17% of all websites on the internet. I’m inclined to lean toward the lower number.(*) But this is still serious since the count is of sites, which included the likes of Google and Yahoo.

Due to the high risk from the flaw, OpenSSL team had issued a patch within 72 hours of being notified and less time from any broad awareness. Most of the larger secure sites implemented the patch immediately. In fact, I first became aware of the flaw when I started getting notices from my banks that they either were never vulnerable, or had already patched their system.

What does Heartbleed do? The flaw allows a hacker to induce the server to send him the contents of a small portion (64 kilobytes) of its memory (remember that a webserver will have 8-64 gigabytes of memory). The affected memory would contain random bits of the server’s recent activity.

This memory could be the contents of its own webpages which anyone could view. It could be the computer language instructions to manage the website. It could also be bits of the conversation between your browser and the server that establishes your secure connection in advance of telling your bank to pay a bill.

All the hacker has to do is get the same server to send him a few thousand 64 KB downloads. Then he has to scan through the mostly binary data for the flecks of gold that are recognizable. Once found, he has to refine those flecks into real knowledge that he can exploit for value. (If that sounds tedious, all of the tasks can be automated.)

What is the risk to you? It’s possible those flecks of gold may include your account name and password. But if the hacker’s goal is passwords, that’s an inefficient way to get them. Every week credentials are being stolen in million-account lots through other security lapses and flaws.

A far more valuable nugget to look for is the webserver’s master key to all its SSL/TLS communications. If a hacker has this, he can create a fake website that your browser will accept as authentic. Then he can execute a perfect phishing or man-in-the-middle attack against any visitor to his bogus site. He can also decrypt previous “secure” traffic to most sites. Of course, the latter two attacks require the hacker either be in the middle or have access to previously recorded internet traffic.

What should you do? Unfortunately, because of how the flaw works, there is no way to know that a specific site has, or has not, been hacked. If your partner has advised you that they have eliminated any risk from this flaw, you should change your password for that site. Take this opportunity to use a strong and unique password for each of your high value web accounts. If available, you might enable 2-factor sign-on to reduce the possibility of an account being hijacked.

Once a site has been patched, they should have received a new SSL certificate and revoked their old, compromised certificate. Unfortunately, as of this writing, there is no reliable way to ensure you know that you aren’t accepting a stolen certificate. Some browsers, maybe with some deep settings, will warn you that a certificate has been revoked. There is one site that will test whether your browser properly recognizes a revoked certificate. There is one known website that can actually serve you a revoked certificate. If you go to http://revoked.grc.com(3), you should receive an error. If your browsers test good and give you the error, you can read more about revocation at(4).

There’s more at risk than just websites. Although I have not seen an authoritative list, SSL is by far the dominant method of protecting electronic communication on the internet. Potentially vulnerable services run the gamut from a sophisticated private VPN to the heavily consumer cloud storage services. They could also include the likes of email, chat and VoIP, or routers for both home use and controlling the internet.

Unfortunately, many of these services are either embedded deeply into the technology or are never managed again after the original configuration. They will be patched slowly or not at all.

Fortunately, as the variety of programs for exploit increases, the number of clients shrinks. If the host in a peer-to-peer network serving two nodes is invaded, it could be devastating for those two, but will not affect anyone else.

Like the number of potentially vulnerable webservers, many of these services are not at risk from Heartbleed because their communications are not encrypted in the first place. Your chat, email, and cloud backups have been coursing through the internet as plain text; easily readable by anyone with a tap on the line – and I don’t mean just governments.

Bill Barnes with Dewey Williams, PCCC

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Notes
(*) The reported risk to 66% of all websites refers to the number of websites that are running webservers that might use OpenSSL. These are primarily the programs Apache and nginx.
This number has to be reduced by the large number of websites that don’t even offer SSL. Again subtract the number what did not install the affected versions of OpenSSL and you get a much lower percentage of the Web. However, with worldwide web sites numbering in the 9 digits (decimal); whether the affected percentage is 30% or 10%, it’s still a huge number. (5)


References
(1)
Blog post “The Second Factor”. http://fromthehelpdesk.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-second-factor.html
(2) AP article “Double-layer passwords …” read in The Charlotte Observer. http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2014/04/26/4865676/tech-tips-double-layer-passwords.html#storylink=cpy
(3) Test website for a revoked certificate. http://revoked.grc.com
(4) Explanation of revoked certificates. https://www.grc.com/revocation.htm (also on podcasts referenced below)
(5) The number of websites truly at risk. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2014/04/08/half-a-million-widely-trusted-websites-vulnerable-to-heartbleed-bug.html.

More references
An early announcement on Heartbleed. http://pc3.org/heartbleed-bug-affects-60-of-secure-internet-servers/
Text and podcasts on Heartbleed. https://grc.com/sn


Creative Commons License. This work by Bill Barnes is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 US License. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://zaitech.com/satellite/contacts.htm.
(cc) 2014- Bill Barnes - Disclaimer - Home Page - Blogs Home

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